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Abstract
Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach, this paper explores which 
organizational forms Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may take. A critical 
question about form is the amount of vertical integration that an ACO may have, 
a topic central to TCE. We posit that contextual factors outside and inside an 
ACO will produce variable transaction costs (the non-production costs of care) 
such that the decision to integrate vertically will derive from a comparison of these 
external versus internal costs, assuming reasonably rational management abilities. 
External costs include those arising from environmental uncertainty and complexity, 
small numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information 
“impactedness.” Internal costs include those arising from human resource activities 
including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplining, appraising, or 
promoting), and otherwise administering programs. At the extreme, these different 
costs may produce either total vertical integration or little to no vertical integration 
with most ACOs falling in between. This essay demonstrates how TCE can be 
applied to the ACO organization form issue, explains TCE, considers ACO activity 
from the TCE perspective, and reflects on research directions that may inform TCE 
and facilitate ACO development.
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Introduction
The issue that we address in this essay concerns possible organizational forms that 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are likely to adopt. Almost any organiza-
tional form may make for an acceptable ACO so long as three preconditions are met: 
(a) the provision of a continuum of care that includes at least ambulatory and inpatient 
care, and postacute care services; (b) the capacity to develop, implement, and monitor 
prospectively planned budgets; (c) sufficient size to be able to report comprehensive, 
valid, and reliable performance measurement across a wide variety of organizational 
and clinical activities (Devers & Berenson, 2009).
At the heart of any question about which particular form an ACO might adopt is the 
extent of vertical integration of services the organization provides. Indeed, industry 
observers and ACO researchers have commonly questioned the degree to which ACOs 
will foster vertically integrative activity among health care providers. Such questions 
include the following: “What degree of integration will ACOs pursue” (Kreindler 
et al., 2012, p. 458); “How integrated are ACOs”; and “Are certain types of ACOs 
more likely to be integrated than other types of ACOs” (Casalino, 2014, p. 1879). 
Within the canon of organization theory, transaction cost economics (TCE) is particu-
larly relevant to the topic of vertical integration (e.g., Mick & Conrad, 1988), center-
ing on the comparative costs of economic exchanges in markets versus internal 
exchanges within organizations. From this perspective, individual services offered by 
providers to patients may be viewed as transactions or exchanges, and the continuum 
of care may be depicted as a chain of transactions throughout the health care delivery 
process. Accordingly, health care providers face the decision of whether they will offer 
services throughout the continuum of care internally as an integrated delivery system 
or whether they will exchange with external providers to meet patients’ needs for cer-
tain services (Stiles, Mick, & Wise, 2001). For example, multihospital systems that 
care for patients who require inpatient rehabilitation services after their general, acute 
care stay face the options of either providing inpatient rehabilitation within the organi-
zation by vertically integrating postacute care offerings or referring such patients to 
external inpatient rehabilitation providers, thereby completing an “exchange” in the 
market. A similar example could be made with preacute services and their “exchanges” 
with general, acute care hospitals (e.g., wellness centers, primary care clinics). In 
short, although ACOs are still in the early stages of development with, for instance, 
only about one in four physician practices joining an ACO (Shortell, McClellan et al., 
2014), TCE nevertheless provides a perspective from which to examine and explain 
integration activity throughout the continuum of care among health care organizations 
(Luke, Ozcan, & Olden, 1995; Mick & Shay, 2014).
A careful consideration of ACO arrangements within a TCE framework also sug-
gests that, rather than simply characterizing ACO forms according to the dichotomous 
groups of strictly internal (i.e., “make”) or external (i.e., “buy”) exchanges, a contin-
uum of ACO forms is possible, even if full integration of some services like behavioral 
health (Lewis et al., 2014) and substance abuse therapy (D’Aunno, Friedman, Chen, & 
Wilson, 2015) is not yet common. At one extreme, an ACO may be organized around 
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numerous small structures offering various professional services linked together by 
legally binding contractual arrangements (Robinson, 1997). At the other extreme, an 
ACO may be a large highly integrated organizational system under single ownership, 
similar to classical integrated delivery systems and health maintenance organizations 
(Shortell, 1997; Shortell, Gillies, Anderson, Erickson, & Mitchell, 2000). Between 
these two extremes, there are endless combinations of organizationally integrated and 
contractually linked services. In this sense, TCE offers an “explanation for organiza-
tional variety” by acknowledging that organizations’ structures and forms will differ, 
given varied transaction types, exchange characteristics, and resources required for 
governance (Scott, 2004, p. 6; see also Mick, 1990; Williamson, 2005).
Given the diversity and fragmentation of the U.S. health care system, the continued 
trends of consolidation and integration throughout the health care industry, and the 
highly different market and environmental contexts that exist within the nation, the 
issue of what ACO arrangements are likely to develop with what performance conse-
quences and under what conditions strike us as a central concern. For example, it is 
unlikely that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to ACOs will work, just as was learned 
from the narrow 1973 federal requirements for health maintenance organizations, 
mandates that frequently led to organizational mismatches between organization forms 
and specific market circumstances (Brown, 1983; Coombs, 2005; Luft, 1981). 
Fortunately, TCE is relevant to the question of vertical integration, and the remainder 
of this essay demonstrates how TCE can be applied to the broad ACO organization 
form issue, including an explanation of TCE, a consideration of ACO activity from the 
TCE perspective, and a reflection on future research directions that may inform TCE 
and facilitate ACO development.
The Theory: Transaction Cost Economics
Originally proposed by Coase (1937), detailed and developed by Williamson (1971, 
1975, 1985), and popularized by Ouchi (1977, 1980), TCE explores the issue of 
diverse organizational forms from the perspective of firm boundaries, assessing the 
efficiency of hierarchical versus market exchanges as a criterion for boundary defini-
tion (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). TCE focuses on nonproduction costs, which histori-
cally include a multitude of market activities: vendor searches, due diligence, contract 
negotiations, contract enforcement, and the like.
Traditionally, advocates of TCE have treated transactions arising from institutional con-
trol or executive fiat as costless, subsumed into the production process. But, some scholars 
have argued that transaction costs exist internally in organizations (e.g., Mick, 1990; Mick 
& Conrad, 1988; Stiles et al., 2001). As Charles Perrow (1981) argued, if organizational 
boundaries are extended so as to encompass the troublesome market transactions (i.e., if 
organizations vertically integrate), unless the factors that made the transaction costly in the 
market are adequately addressed, the inefficiency experienced in the market will manifest 
internally as well. Furthermore, inside organizations, transaction costs also result from 
human resource activities including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplin-
ing, appraising, or promoting), and otherwise administering programs.
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In any event, TCE states that a number of environmental circumstances may lead to 
increased transaction costs in the market, including uncertainty and complexity, small 
numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information 
“impactedness,” each of which we elaborate below as they relate to ACOs. Collectively, 
these exchange characteristics contribute to the impact of opportunism and bounded 
rationality—two central factors within exchange processes assumed by the TCE 
perspective—on transaction relationships (Oliver, 1990). Opportunism refers to the 
tendency of actors to pursue self-serving behaviors, even with guile, in order to take 
advantage of any given situation, while bounded rationality refers to the imperfect 
rationality exhibited by decision makers due to informational, cognitive, or temporal 
limits (Williamson, 1985). Thus, actors’ efforts to address these limiting forces in the 
market exchange process require such significant transaction costs that the internaliza-
tion of exchanges needed to provide or produce a given service or good may be more 
favorable and less expensive, thereby explaining the necessity and emergence of inte-
grated organizations.
But, as noted above and argued explicitly by Mick and Shay (2014), transaction 
costs within organizations are variable, and one cannot count on the assumption, as do 
Williamson and others, that internal exchanges will almost always be lower than mar-
ket exchanges even when extreme market forces lead to high market transaction costs. 
This may be particularly true when accounting for the costs of decision making, con-
trol, or enforcement within organizations, as well as troublesome factors that may 
make exchanges costly regardless of whether they are internal or external (Perrow, 
1981). Thus, external market exchanges should be balanced against intraorganiza-
tional exchanges, with a decision on whether to “make” or “buy” depending on which 
set of costs is higher (Mick & Conrad, 1988).
At the same time, although TCE’s arguments are often generalized to suggest that 
organizations simply face a “make-or-buy decision,” the perspective allows for more 
than just two possible outcomes in terms of organizational forms. In other words, the 
degree to which activities in the production of a service or product are integrated 
within an organization varies given the nature of the market, the organization, and the 
transactions themselves.
The Context: Accountable Care Organizations
The ACO movement provides a good organizational context for applying TCE. The 
central question addressed by TCE is what organizational form or forms will be most 
appropriate such that transaction costs are minimized and the efficient delivery of 
health care services will result. Should ACOs adopt contractually based structures 
tying together numerous freestanding units—private practice physician offices, clin-
ics, urgent care centers, hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, among others—or should 
ACOs adopt more integrated, self-contained, single-ownership arrangements typical 
of staff and group model health maintenance organizations? What will be the com-
parative transaction costs between market purchases of units that are required to com-
pose an ACO versus internalization of these units in a single overarching structure?
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To present a foundation from which such questions may be explored, we consider 
each of the previously mentioned factors potentially affecting market transaction 
costs: small numbers bargaining, information impactedness, asset specificity, fre-
quency of exchanges, and uncertainty and complexity.
Small numbers bargaining—when an organization is confronted by a limited num-
ber of product or service choices that increases the likelihood that a buyer will be 
exploited due to the lack of alternatives—favors internalizing the production of the 
product or service. In other words, situations characterized by few buyers or sellers are 
likely to result in market failure given TCE’s assumptions of opportunistic exchange 
partners, thereby promoting vertical integration activity (Ouchi, 1980). For example, 
as ACOs promote the oversight and control of medical services throughout the con-
tinuum of care, hospital-based providers operating in local markets with relatively few 
providers in other areas of the care continuum (e.g., physician practices, postacute care 
providers) may pursue vertical integration, particularly in smaller or rural markets 
(Cutler & Morton, 2013).
Yet another market feature causing internalization is information “impactedness” 
or information asymmetry. This factor describes the situation in which one market 
actor has, while another lacks, information to understand adequately the circumstances 
surrounding a potential exchange, which reinforces the notion of “bounded rational-
ity” among economic actors. For example, as ACOs aim to reduce the fragmentation 
among physicians, hospitals, and other providers, the ability of ACO members to work 
cooperatively in acquiring and sharing information—from patients’ medical informa-
tion across the full continuum of care to organizational learning regarding key suc-
cesses and failures—is key to their collective success (Fisher & Shortell, 2010). 
According to the TCE perspective, vertical integration throughout the continuum of 
care may enable an ACO and its members to more effectively manage information, 
such that regardless of where a patient seeks and receives care along the continuum, 
providers are better informed as to the patient’s history, condition, and needs, and the 
organization is better equipped to manage health services capably and effectively. In 
this respect, scholars have highlighted the importance of robust health information 
technology infrastructure and exchange among integrated providers within successful 
ACOs (Burns & Pauly, 2012; Diana, Walker, Mora, & Zhang, 2015; Fisher, Shortell, 
Kreindler, Van Citters, & Larson, 2012; Kreindler et al., 2012).
Argued by some to be the most significant determinant of vertical integration 
among the transaction characteristics described by TCE (e.g., Sawant, 2012), asset 
specificity pertains to durable and specialized investments that are made and custom-
ized to support a specific transaction. As transaction relationships develop, those that 
become idiosyncratic—such that the exchange parties’ specific identities matter—may 
be characterized by heightened asset specificity, and both buyers and suppliers become 
fully committed to the transaction (Williamson, 1979). Such a description may apply 
to a variety of contexts, including the exchange of transaction-specific assets involv-
ing physical, human, or site-specific capital as well as intangible assets such as brand 
name capital and temporal specificity (Joskow, 2008; Tadelis & Williamson, 2012). 
Shay and Mick (2013) highlight examples of ways in which asset specificity observed 
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across these different contexts may become heightened in exchange relationships 
prompted by ACO membership, noting that providers’ shared pursuit of advanced care 
coordination demands investments in personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. The 
TCE perspective suggests that circumstances characterized by heightened asset 
specificity—such as we see in the development of ACO models—require such signifi-
cant investments that they tend to favor internal exchange in lieu of market-based 
transactions.
Furthermore, in the presence of asset specificity, increases in exchange frequency 
of transactions between parties motivate hierarchical, integrated structures, allowing 
organizations to minimize monitoring costs, gain efficiencies, and control the overall 
sequence of exchanges (Williamson, 1979). For example, as ACO arrangements moti-
vate hospitals to increasingly pursue exclusive relationships with partnering medical 
groups or postacute care providers, the combination of asset specific investments and 
increased exchanges within these relationships may lead to vertical integration activity 
as a more efficient means for the ACO to conduct transactions.
In the presence of asset specificity, TCE suggests that increases in uncertainty also 
lead to increased transaction costs. Market uncertainty and complexity may lead to 
efforts to internalize the market’s components that contribute to such uncertainty and 
complexity. For ACOs, sources of uncertainty and complexity are many, including 
referral patterns, electronic health record interoperability, competitive responses, reg-
ulatory changes, and financial and legal arrangements, among others. Internalization 
through organizational structure—what Williamson (1975) refers to as hierarchy—
may enable organizations to achieve clearer and more coherent decisions, controlled 
processes, and convergent goals. In other words, internalization is theorized to yield 
benefits that offset the impact of uncertainty and complexity on market exchanges. For 
ACOs, examples of such internalization could include a hospital system’s acquisition 
of a physician group or postacute provider to stabilize referral patterns or develop a 
common electronic health record platform.
Milliken (1987) described various forms of uncertainty, including the unpredict-
ability and complexity of an organizational environment (i.e., “state uncertainty”), the 
unpredictability of the effects of environmental change (i.e., “effect uncertainty”), and 
the inability of organizations to adequately discern their options when responding to 
contingencies or to determine the consequences of such options (i.e., “response uncer-
tainty”). More recently, Weber and Mayer (2014) expanded on the concept of uncer-
tainty in TCE by introducing and examining interpretive uncertainty, which emphasizes 
the role of bounded rationality in organizations’ adoption of hierarchical forms and 
suggests that conflicts in exchange partners’ cognitive frames and expectations gener-
ate considerable transaction costs. According to this logic, hierarchical forms may be 
preferred even in the absence of asset specificity when exchange parties exhibit incom-
patible cognitive frames or highly divergent traits, as these frames and traits shape 
each firm’s interpretation of the exchange (Weber & Mayer, 2014).
A variety of factors contribute to exchange partners’ differing cognitive frames or 
traits, including membership in different industries or sectors, reliance on different 
technologies, or adherence to different laws and cultures, among others (Weber & 
Mick and Shay 655
Mayer, 2014). Recognizing the varying characteristics, cultures, regulations, dominant 
technologies, and financing models observed in other sectors throughout the contin-
uum of care (e.g., primary care, postacute care, end-of-life care, etc.), different cogni-
tive frames may exist between a general, acute care provider and its other partners 
within an ACO, thereby contributing to interpretive uncertainty. For example, an acute 
care hospital may fear shared savings reimbursement models that incentivize provid-
ers to keep patients out of hospitals, whereas a primary care practice partnering with 
that hospital in an ACO may view the same model as an opportunity. Considering the 
uncertainty and complexity that has long characterized the contemporary U.S. health 
care delivery system, we suggest that ACOs promote increased exchange opportuni-
ties while presenting opportunities for heightened uncertainty. For example, the inclu-
sion of separate provider organizations in an ACO requires a challenging degree of 
coordination, including legal, technical, strategic, and financial considerations as well 
as transparent communication, relationship management, and teamwork to collec-
tively realize quality and process improvements (DeVore & Champion, 2011; Shortell, 
Casalino, & Fisher, 2010).
The TCE perspective suggests that vertical integration may remedy transaction 
costs stemming from diverse sources of uncertainty, providing ACOs with a means to 
limit opportunistic behavior, defend competitive advantages, adeptly pursue adaptive 
strategies in the face of unforeseen contingencies, and enforce common interpretations 
and expectations of the organization and external environment. At the same time, 
internal transaction costs may well increase due to the administrative complications 
and challenges of continually internalizing exchanges wrought by vertical integration. 
Hence, we argue that a full application of TCE theory includes a simultaneous com-
parative analysis of external and internal costs.
Caveats and Research Challenges
On the one hand, TCE predictions that ACO models may direct organizations to pur-
sue vertical integration are consistent with scholars’ claims and assertions that ACOs 
encourage vertical integration activity (e.g., Burns & Pauly, 2012; Richman & 
Schulman, 2011). On the other hand, there is nothing automatic or deterministic about 
TCE’s logic predicting a highly vertically integrated ACO or one that is not. Because 
of the difficulties of measuring comparative transaction costs, it might be unreason-
able to expect that health care managers would even be able to apply a TCE approach 
to the integration decision. Adroit managers may be able to figure out where high 
transaction costs are located both within their organizations and between theirs and 
other organizations, and if they can, then they may be able to guide their organizations 
to improved efficiencies by successfully pursuing the levels of integrative activity that 
best fit their exchange needs based on an almost intuitive or qualitative sense of com-
parative transaction costs.
For that matter, it merits further consideration that health care organizations may 
pursue a myriad of arrangements pairing integration with external exchange, as previ-
ously noted. Integration and deintegration decisions are not uniform across health care 
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organizations but can occur simultaneously in response to various forces and factors 
that are specific to individual organizations, their markets, and their environments 
(Mick, 1990). Thus, scholars have acknowledged the diversity of ACO forms, with 
varying degrees of vertical integration exhibited among different arrangements includ-
ing those built on independent practice associations, combining independent practice 
associations with a group practice model, partnering hospitals with independent physi-
cians and postacute providers, or existing entirely within a single integrated delivery 
system, among others (e.g., Kreindler et al., 2012; Shortell, Wu et al., 2014).
Furthermore, recent advances in TCE thinking emphasize the role that social 
dynamics may play in affecting the decision to internalize exchange processes. That is, 
relational characteristics may influence exchange decisions in addition to transaction 
characteristics, and exchange relationships characterized by high levels of trust, reci-
procity, and information transfer may overcome motivations to vertically integrate, 
instead fostering innovation and joint problem solving outside of formal organiza-
tional boundaries (Remneland-Wikhamn & Knights, 2012; Shay & Mick, 2013; Weber 
& Mayer, 2014).
Thus, due to the social dynamics influencing exchange relationships ACOs may 
resemble partnerships that lack formal vertically integrated structures—including part-
nerships between providers and health plans, health systems and physician networks, 
and an ACO’s primary care medical home providers and specialty associates (e.g., 
DeVore & Champion, 2011; Goldsmith, 2011)—and still be consistent with the TCE 
perspective. To the degree that the TCE perspective explains diversity in organizations’ 
integrative activity, including virtually integrated structures that thrive on embedded 
network relationships, it also speaks to the diverse forms exhibited by ACOs in regard 
to their integration models (Kreindler et al., 2012; Shortell, Wu et al., 2014).
Where do we go from here? Future research opportunities abound as ACOs con-
tinue to develop and grow, and as we continue to learn more about their implementa-
tion, operation, and performance. In terms of research regarding ACOs, the TCE 
perspective may benefit scholars working to understand the difficulties confronted by 
ACOs, allowing for consideration of the complex factors that affect ACOs and their 
members. What market conditions and exchange characteristics relate to the presence 
of either formally or virtually integrated structures within ACO models? Would 
addressing varying exchange characteristics influence the operation and performance 
of ACOs? Are there certain elements of exchanges—for example, certain forms of 
asset specificity—that prove to be more influential in shaping ACOs’ organizational 
forms and strategies? What external and internal transaction costs are actually being 
confronted by ACOs today, including those that may have been previously unantici-
pated or overlooked, and how might these costs be remedied?
Such questions may also benefit scholars of the TCE perspective, identifying ways 
in which the varying exchange relationships observed in varying ACO models influ-
ence organizations’ decisions to internalize market transactions. As recent TCE think-
ing has emphasized the role of social dynamics in organizations’ exchange processes, 
ACOs may prove a fertile ground from which the relationship between social dynam-
ics and organizational transactions may be further examined and better understood.
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In conclusion, we argue that the TCE perspective highlights ways in which organi-
zations may rationalize decisions to integrate vertically, viewing the internalization of 
processes and steps within ACOs as more efficient and, ultimately, preferable com-
pared with the collection of such steps outside of the organization. However, the abil-
ity to keep internal transaction costs from outstripping external costs—even in the case 
where external transaction costs are high—may be linked to the skill and aptitude of 
ACO management to keep a sober eye on the size and complexity of administrative 
structures put in place to manage increasingly complicated internal exchanges sur-
rounding patient care.
Thus, the transaction costs raised in the pursuit of ACO models may foster consoli-
dation among participating providers, but at what net cost? This question becomes 
more salient as industry observers have noted vertical integration and consolidation 
activities in the wake of ACO development, and recent research points to an associa-
tion between ACO formation and provider integration (Auerbach, Liu, Hussey, Lau, & 
Mehrotra, 2013). At the same time, TCE allows for a range of organizational boundar-
ies as exchanges vary according to diverse transactional and relational characteristics, 
consistent with the different ACO forms that have already emerged in just a few years 
(Shortell, Wu et al., 2014). Those looking for a simple “make-or-buy” decision when 
applying TCE thinking to the ACO model may find this to be perplexing, but we sug-
gest the ACO model reflects the complexity and richness of the TCE perspective, 
challenging us to think more deeply about ACOs and how they relate to our under-
standing of health care organizations, their boundaries, and the conditions in which 
they operate.
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